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Abstract
Workers trained in STEM are generally viewed as essential for innovation-led economic
growth. Yet, recent statistics suggest that a majority of STEM undergraduates do not go on
to pursue innovation-focused careers in their fields of study. We investigate whether STEM
students who do not self-select into innovative tasks are doing so because they are less
capable than their peers who do. We find that monetary inducement among STEM students
increases aggregate innovative output, but that low-GPA students who were induced signifi-
cantly underperform relative to low-GPA students who self-selected; however, induced and
self-selected high-GPA students perform statistically the same. In contrast, words of
encouragement appears to benefit those students with the lowest GPAs. Our results high-
light the value of efforts to increase the pool of STEM students who pursue innovative
careers and underscore the importance of interventions targeted at specific student sub-
groups to maximize the returns on those efforts.
Introduction
Innovation has long been viewed as important for productivity and income growth [1, 2].
Organizational and government policy generally aims to foster innovation by targeting the
quantity and quality of individuals employed in innovative careers [3]. While innovative out-
put is not concentrated within any single industry or field [4], one potentially important target
for these policies is undergraduate science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) stu-
dents who acquire a disproportionate share of the hard skills required to introduce high impact
innovations into the economy [5].
Yet, despite the skills they accumulate during their Bachelor’s degrees, many STEM stu-
dents do not end up in careers that require them to apply these skills to innovation. For
instance, in 2014 the US Census Bureau reported that 74% of people with STEM undergradu-
ate degrees were not employed in STEM jobs [6] despite a robust labor market in this area—
nearly 2.4 million STEM job postings in the US are projected to go unfilled in 2018 alone [7].
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Part of this under-supply of labor for STEM jobs is likely because STEM degrees allow gradu-
ates to pursue a range of lucrative careers that do not require them to innovate, thus making
the link between STEM education and innovative output weaker than may be expected [8].
Whether efforts to encourage more of these graduates to enter innovative careers will
increase the innovativeness of the economy depends fundamentally on why they are not enter-
ing such careers in the first place. Are they self-selecting out because they know they are not
well-suited to the task at hand, or are other factors shaping their career choices?
In this paper, we explore whether computer science and engineering (CSE) undergraduate
students can be induced to participate in an innovative task they were otherwise unwilling to
participate in, and we investigate the degree to which their initial unwillingness is due to their
abilities relative to their peers who did not need additional financial inducement to participate.
More specifically, we explore three inter-related questions in the context of CSE students: (1)
Can reluctant individuals be induced to innovate? (2) Are induced innovators less able to
innovate than those who self-select into innovative activities? (3) What is the impact of encour-
agement on the performance of innovators, and does this differ between self-selected and
induced innovators?
The interventions we implemented to investigate these research questions were undertaken
within an innovation contest for undergraduate CSE students at the University of California,
San Diego (UCSD). We compare self-selected innovators to a sample of induced innovators
with similar technical training to test if they differ in their contest-relevant skills, and we exam-
ine their relative quantity and quality of output on an innovative task. We also assess the differ-
ential effects of confidence boosting messages across these populations to determine whether
this type of encouragement intervention impacts innovative outcomes, and whether the
induced innovators’ performance benefits more from these efforts.
As expected, based on observable characteristics, the induced participants were different
than those who volunteered; they were less likely to be drawn from majors that provide the
most relevant skills for the competition and they had lower average cumulative GPAs
(CGPAs). Despite this, aggregate innovative output appears similar between the induced
and self-selected participants, and we find that inducement can increase the rate of innova-
tion. Encouragement appears to have no effect on average participant performance. More-
over, it does not appear to have a differential effect for those induced, suggesting that
confidence boosting is not essential for the reluctant participants once they are induced to
participate.
However, as predicted by the framework that motivates our experimental design, these
average effects mask important heterogeneity in the impacts of each treatment arm. In partic-
ular, among low CGPA participants, the quality of induced participants’ innovations was sig-
nificantly lower than that of self-selected participants and the submission rate among these
induced participants was about half that of their self-selected peers. At the same time, stu-
dents with lower classroom performance are helped by encouragement. In contrast, not only
do high CGPA students not benefit from this encouragement, but they appear to be harmed
by it.
Ultimately, our results suggest that it is possible to increase the proportion of STEM under-
graduate students who are willing to engage in applied innovation and that this increases total
innovative output. Inducements are likely to bear the most fruit when targeted toward stu-
dents with high innovative potential, as proxied by information that is readily available to pol-
icy makers. The message for encouragement is less intuitive, as it appears helpful to students
with lower CGPAs but harmful to those at the higher end of the academic achievement
distribution.
Increasing STEM undergraduate participation in innovative activities
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Materials and methods
Our experimental design and analysis are motivated by a simple and stylized framework that
allows for different preferences and abilities for innovative activities. The utility function used
in the framework is consistent with our setting, but intended to be general enough to be useful
in other settings as well.
Motivating framework
There are n students who each have an innovative type α. This α may affect a student’s cost of
innovative activities, their expected likelihood of a successful innovative activity outcome, or
both. For simplicity, assume there are two possible α’s. In reality, there is a continuum of α
types but to be consistent with our empirical setting, this framework focuses on those at the
margin of selecting into innovation. Students are presented with an opportunity to spend time
on an innovative activity, referred to as an “innovation contest” that will pay them R if they
succeed. Each student i succeeds with some probability p(success|αi) and has a cost c(αi) of
spending time on the contest. Therefore, student i’s expected utility from participating in the
innovation contest is E(Ui|αi) = p(success|αi)R − c(αi).
Suppose that E(Ui|α1)� E(Ui|α2) either because p(success|α1)� p(success|α2), or c(α2)> c
(α1), or both. The latter inequality is plausible even among very similar populations as in our
empirical setting because preferences for innovating vary across individuals. In addition, sup-
pose that E(Ui|α1)� O� E(Ui|α2) so that only students with α1 participate in the innovation
contest. Going forward, we refer to these students as “self-selected innovators” because they
are the ones that choose to voluntarily enter the contest based on their skills and costs of
participation.
Subsidy introduction. Suppose now that those who have not selected into the innovation
contest are offered some subsidy S that is large enough to induce participation. As a result,
their expected utility from participating is now: E(Ui|α2) = p(success|α2)R − c(α2) + S> 0.
Importantly, we assume that S does not affect p(success|αi). Due to possible income effects, the
subsidy is subsequently offered to α1 type students as well, albeit after they have elected to par-
ticipate in the study to avoid influencing their participation decision.
If E(Ui|α1)� E(Ui|α2) because p(success|α1)� p(success|α2), and c(α1) is not less than c
(α2), then self-selected innovators are more likely to succeed in the innovation contest than
those innovators who were induced innovators. Alternatively, if E(Ui|α1)� E(Ui|α2) because
c(α2)� c(α1), and p(success|α1) is not greater than p(success|α2), then self-selected innovators
are no more likely to succeed in the innovation contest than those who were induced innova-
tors. Although we are only allowing for one possible low α type in our model, in reality, it is
possible that there are low α types who have higher costs of innovating but similar abilities to
those of self-selected innovators and low α types who have lower likelihoods of success than
self-selected innovators. We test for this possibility empirically in the Results section of the
paper.
Based on this framework, our hypotheses are summarized by the following two
propositions:
Proposition 1: If self-selected and induced innovators differ only in their probability of suc-
cessfully innovating, then induced innovators should perform worse than self-selected
innovators.
Proposition 2: If self-selected and induced innovators differ only in their cost of innovation,
then, conditional on the cost of innovating being incurred, they should perform no worse
on innovative activities.
Increasing STEM undergraduate participation in innovative activities
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These propositions motivate the “inducement” intervention in our study, in which a ran-
dom subset of eligible students who do not initially sign up to participate in an innovation con-
test are offered a $100 subsidy, in the form of a Visa gift card, to do so.
Encouragement intervention. While our subsidy intervention focused on the costs of
participating in innovative activities, one could also try to improve the success rate of innova-
tors p(success|αi) through a series of managerial interventions. In our case, we envision a
confidence boosting intervention where confidence is defined as a student’s belief in their like-
lihood of success in innovation. This intervention is motivated by evidence that lack confi-
dence in abilities [9, 10] and fear of failure [11] are important barriers to pursuing STEM
careers.
Suppose this intervention increases p(success|αi) if a student’s i is below some threshold.
This may be the case if, for instance, lack of confidence causes poor performance due to anxi-
ety-induced choking [12]. Moreover, to avoid generating performance harming over-confi-
dence [13], our intervention provides encouragement rather than suggest to workers that they
have exceptional skills. Planners cannot observe ex-ante which student’s are under-confident.
If what differentiates α1 and α2 types is how confident in their abilities they are, then this inter-
vention will raise p(α2) by more than p(α1).
Thus, the role of encouragement in our innovation environment can be summarized by the
following proposition:
Proposition 3: If high and low type innovators differ in self-confidence, then interventions
aimed at increasing student confidence in their abilities will increase innovative activity
performance among low type innovators (α2s) more than it will among high type ones
(α1s).
This proposition motivates the “encouragement” treatment in our experiment in which a
random subset of students participating in the innovation contest are sent a schedule of confi-
dence boosting emails throughout the contest period.
Experiment design & implementation
We studied the differences between people who self-select into innovating and those who have
to be induced to do so, and the effects of our encouragement treatment within an innovation
contest. This contest was open to all 3,445 undergraduate students enrolled in the CSE depart-
ment at UC San Diego, a top 10 globally ranked department [14] that offers “. . .a broad and
rigorous curriculum designed to provide students with the strong academic education and
technical training necessary for placement in the competitive high-tech job market as well as
for advanced studies in graduate school [15].” The contest required participants to design and/
or develop an application that helps people fall asleep faster individualized based on each per-
son’s characteristics. This problem was defined through discussions with several executives
and entrepreneurs in technology industries, some of whom served as contest judges. It is both
an important problem that does not yet have an ideal solution, and one that we believed the
undergraduate students could make reasonable progress on within a three month window. To
ensure students who signed up for the contest earlier would not have a head start on the prob-
lem, students were not told about the specific problem until after the induced sample’s sign-up
deadline had passed.
The contest was promoted by the UCSD CSE department over a two-month period in early
2017. Submissions made by the contest deadline were evaluated by five technology industry
participants who evaluated each submission across four categories–functionality, user-friendli-
ness, novelty, and potential commercial value–and provided a score of 1-5 on each category
Increasing STEM undergraduate participation in innovative activities
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for a total score maximum of 20. The developers of the top three applications were awarded
prize money. First place received $5,000, second place received $2,000, and third place received
$1,000.
We randomly selected 1,000 students who were enrolled in CSE undergraduate majors at
UCSD but who did not sign up by the original deadline to receive our inducement interven-
tion. We over-sampled females in who we targeted for inducement because we hypothesized
that they would respond differently to inducement than males. As S3 and S4 Tables demon-
strate, our hypothesis was incorrect. We also over-sampled students enrolled in electrical engi-
neering or computer science majors to mirror the sample of participants who signed-up
before the original contest deadline.
Taking up the inducement offer did not require students to do anything other than put
their name on the list of contest participants and agree to receive emails about the contest.
Those who received our inducement offer but did not sign up for the contest in response are
not in our sample; thus, we do not analyze the differences between those who take up the
inducement and those who do not. In order to provide this incentive, the initial contest sign-
up deadline was extended by one week. One possible concern with the inducement interven-
tion is that those who signed up after receiving it did so because they did not see any of the
contest announcements that were sent out prior to the inducement treatment. We think this is
unlikely because the CSE department and the entrepreneurship center located within the
department sent out numerous emails to students about the contest over a two month period.
Therefore, even if the induced population did not read the emails announcing the contest,
they would have chosen not to based on the subject line that made clear there was a contest
being announced.
Students who had already signed up to participate (self-selected participants) were
informed about the sign-up deadline extension and about the monetary incentive being
offered to some students to increase the participant pool. While this disclosure was designed to
avoid contamination of our treatment through ex post discovery, it is possible that informing
self-selected innovators that we would be attempting to increase the participant pool could
affect their effort [16]. The ultimate magnitude and direction of this change in effort, should it
exist, would depend on participant priors about the initial size of the applicant pool. However,
given the short sign-up extension window and the small number of induced students who
signed up to participate, we believe it would have at most a very modest impact. Due to possi-
ble income effects, self-selected participants were also told they would receive the same amount
of money being offered to the students who had not yet signed up. Given that those who sign
up before the initial deadline were not expecting this payment so it will not bias our measure
of intent. The emails sent to both the students in our inducement sample, and to the students
who had self-selected into the contest are provided in S3 Fig. The innovation contest began the
day after the extended contest sign-up deadline at which point the contest problem was
revealed to students.
To implement our encouragement treatment, we randomly selected induced and self-
selected students to receive 4 confidence boosting emails over the course of the contest. The
text included in the emails differs from one email to the next, but they are all written to provide
versions of messages that have been shown to correlate with employee satisfaction and produc-
tivity in organizational behavior research [17]. The complete texts of each email are included
in S4 Fig.
This study was approved by the UC San Diego Institutional Review Board, project number
161649. Students were not aware that the innovation contest was part of a research study. A
waiver of consent was approved for this study because the research could not be practicably
implemented without the waiver. The waiver was requested primarily to prevent contributor
Increasing STEM undergraduate participation in innovative activities
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behavioral responses due to an awareness that they were being studied. For example, students
who take up the inducement offer and know that they are being studied because of it may
become aware that they are different than those who self-selected into the contest in ways that
affects their performance [18]. Similarly, students may respond differently to managerial inter-
ventions if they are aware they are part of a study on responses to managerial interventions.
More generally, even if the details of the research study are not given to participants, they may
still perform differently than if they were not aware of being observed [19].
Empirical estimation
Given that the goal of our study is to first compare the performance of two distinct samples of
innovators and second to evaluate a randomized treatment, our analysis of average perfor-
mance differences focuses on mean comparisons across the induced and self-selected and the
encouraged and non-encouraged groups.
We also test whether these mean differences change when individual observable differences
are accounted for using regressions that control for participant characteristics and present
these findings in S1 and S2 Tables. Importantly, because we expect that the primary mecha-
nism through which induced and self-selected innovators’ performance will differ is through
different motivations for selection into participation, including controls for participant charac-
teristics eliminates important explanatory variation for performance differences between the
two participant types. The encouragement treatment was randomly assigned to participants
who had already selected into the contest, so we do not expect that participant characteristics
will vary by encouragement treatment (comparisons are presented in the results section). As
with inducement, we nonetheless run our regression analysis of the effects of encouragement
on outcomes with and without controls for these characteristics.
As our framework presented above demonstrates, we expect the difference between self-
selected and induced participants and the impacts of our encouragement treatment will
depend on students’ innovative abilities. Using cumulative GPA as our best proxy of this abil-
ity, we assess this directly by estimating the following equation:
Yi ¼ ai þ b1ðInterventioniÞ þ b2ðHighCGPAiÞ þ b3ðTreatmenti �HighCGPAiÞ þ �i ð1Þ
where Yi is a measure of performance or participation, Interventioni is equal to one if partici-
pant i is induced or received the encouragement intervention, and HighCGPAi is equal to one
if participant i has above the sample median cumulative GPA. We estimate these equations
separately for comparing induced and self-selected participants, and for evaluating the effects
of the encouragement treatment.
While CGPA is far from an ideal proxy for the likelihood of successfully innovating, it is
easily observable (particularly relative to more direct measures of innovative capability among
students who have not previously engaged in innovation), and existing evidence demonstrates
that it is correlated with factors that are also correlated with innovative capability [20].
Results
Our contest design yielded 103 self-selected innovators—students who signed up to participate
before the innovation contest sign-up deadline without inducement; and 87 induced innova-
tors—students who only joined the contest after the provision of our financial inducement.
The encouragement intervention was randomly allocated to half of the participants in each
arm. Thus, our sample sizes per treatment arm are as follows: 52 participants in the self-
selected, no encouragement group; 51 in the self-selected with encouragement group; 44 in the
induced, no encouragement group; and 43 in the induced with encouragement group.
Increasing STEM undergraduate participation in innovative activities
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Data on participant degree majors, gender, year of study, GPA, and whether they have pre-
viously participated in an innovation contest were collected through surveys administered
when students signed up for the contest. Our outcome measures include a simple binary vari-
able indicating whether a project was submitted for consideration by contest judges as well as
the judges’ scoring of projects that were submitted. Each project was scored by three judges.
Our preferred measure of the quality of submissions is the average ranking judges gave each
project. Each judge scored 7 projects, so this measure ranges from 1-7 with 7 as the highest
and 1 as the lowest. However, our findings are robust to alternative measures, including nor-
malized average scores, as shown in S5 Table.
We also ran a survey following the conclusion of the contest to better understand students’
experience with the contest. There were four versions of the survey, one for each treatment
group combination, where each shared a common group of questions as well as some that
were specific to treatment status. All survey questions are reported in S5 Fig. The dataset
used in our analysis is publicly available through UC San Diego’s Digital Collections data
repository [21].
Average differences between induced and self-selected innovators
Selection into participation. Panel A of Table 1 demonstrates important differences
between the induced and self-selected participant populations. Induced participants are less
likely to be drawn from majors that provide the most relevant skills for the competition, and
they had lower cumulative GPAs. Consistent with the predictions of our conceptual frame-
work, inducement appears to lead students with lower probabilities of success or higher costs
of participation to participate by increasing the pay-offs to participation. For instance, students
with lower GPAs who agree to participate upon receiving monetary inducement may have less
financial security than those who participate without the inducement, and this financial inse-
curity may also affect their GPA by requiring them to work outside of school.
Differences in outcomes. Despite the mean comparisons suggesting that the induced par-
ticipants may be less well equipped to compete, the total output of these participants appears
statistically indistinguishable from the output of those that self-selected into the competition.
In particular, mean submissions across induced and self-selected innovators presented in
Panel B of Table 1 demonstrate that induced participants have slightly lower mean submission
rates than self-selected ones but that this difference is far from statistically significant. With
our sample size, we would have needed a difference in submission rate of 6 percentage points
to detect a significant difference between the induced and self-selected sample which is several
times larger than the 1.5 percentage points we observe. Importantly, while we cannot conclude
that induced and self-selected participants have different submission rates, we can conclude
that inducement increases total innovative output. Induced innovators’ likelihood of submit-
ting a project to the contest is significantly larger than zero (p-value<0.01).
The difference in average innovative output quality conditional on submitting between
induced and self-selected participants is reasonably large, with self-selected participant output
scoring more than 22% higher on average than induced participant output. Although this dif-
ference is not statistically significant (with our sample size, a difference in scores of 1.172
would be statistically significant), it provides suggestive evidence that induced innovators may
have lower average quality of innovative output relative to self-selected innovators.
While average outcomes are important for understanding aggregate changes in innovative
output caused by increasing the pool of innovators through inducement, whether the distribu-
tion of submission quality differs for the self-selected and induced participants is also impor-
tant for understanding whether inducement can lead to increases in very high impact
Increasing STEM undergraduate participation in innovative activities
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innovation. This is particularly important for innovation management and policy because the
majority of returns from innovation are generated by a small minority of innovations [22]. To
investigate distributional differences in the quality of submissions, we plot the distribution of
average rankings conditional on submissions for the self-selected and inducement samples
(see S1 Fig). Consistent with the suggestive evidence that the quality of self-selected output is
higher than that of the induced sample, it does appear that the induced sample has a higher fre-
quency of low performance relative to the self-selected sample. At the same time, we do not
find evidence that the likelihood of very high performance differs meaningfully for the two
samples.
Average effects of receiving an encouragement during the contest
Table 2 presents mean comparisons between participants who did and did not receive the
encouragement treatment. As described earlier, the encouragement treatment was randomly
assigned so participants who received the encouragement treatment should look similar to
those who did not. Panel A on Table 2 largely confirms this with one minor exception. There
Table 1. Mean participant characteristic and performance comparisons by self-selected and induced innovators.
Self-Selected Induced p-value
Panel A: Characteristics
Female 0.252 0.272 0.726
(0.043) (0.034)
CS/EE Major 0.786 0.487 0.000���
0.040 0.042
Year of Study 2.941 3.111 0.365
(0.120) (0.146)
CGPA (1-6) 4.500 4.274 0.096�
(0.091) (0.101)
Above Median CGPA 0.663 0.521 0.065�
(0.049) (0.060)
Prior Contest Experience 0.163 0.093 0.154
(0.036) (0.032)
Panel B: Outcomes
Average Ranking 0.390 0.264 0.460
(0.126) (0.108)
Submitted Project 0.096 0.081 0.725
(0.029) (0.030)
Average Ranking 4.016 3.285 0.379
Conditional on Submitting (0.497) (0.653)
N 104 86
Notes: The table compares average characteristics and innovation contest performance of self-selected and induced students. The p-values of t-tests assessing whether
the means are significantly different across the two groups of students are reported in the fourth column. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Female and CS/EE
Major weighted to account for over sampling in the induced treatment. CGPA is measured on a scale from 1-6 with 1 being less than 2.0, 2 being 2.0-2.49, 3 being 2.50-
2.99, 4 being 3.0-3.49, 5 being 3.50-3.99, and 6 being 4.0. Average ranking is equal to the average rank assigned to the project by the three judges assigned to the project
for participants who submitted a project for judgment, and zero for those who did not. Each judge scored 7 projects, so this measure ranges from 7 as the highest rank to
1 as the lowest.
� significant at 10%;
�� significant at 5%;
��� significant at 1%
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214155.t001
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is a small statistically significant difference at the 10% level in whether or not a participant is in
a computer science or electrical engineering major. To ensure that this difference is not driving
our findings, we confirm that all our results are robust to controlling for it in regression analy-
ses (see S2 Table).
Panel B of Table 2 presents mean outcomes by encouragement treatment status. Interest-
ingly, encouragement does not appear to have a consistent or significant impact on participant
outcomes in the contest. For submission rates to have been significantly different between par-
ticipants who received the encouragement treatment and those who did not with our sample
size, we would have needed to observe a difference of about 5.5 percentage points (or almost
twice the size of what we find). Similarly, we would have needed to observe a mean average
ranking difference of about 0.95, more than twice as big as the difference we observe, for sub-
mission quality to have been significantly different with our sample size.
Moreover, as reported in S6 Table, we do not find any differential impacts of encourage-
ment across the induced and self-selected populations as described in Proposition 3, suggest-
ing that lack of confidence may not be the primary explanation for why some students select
Table 2. Mean participant characteristic and performance comparisons by encouragement treatment.
Not Encouraged Encouraged p-value
Panel A: Characteristics
Female 0.375 0.287 0.201
(0.050) (0.047)
CS/EE Major 0.760 0.648 0.093�
(0.044) (0.049)
Year of Study 2.901 3.130 0.218
(0.137) (0.125)
CGPA (1-6) 4.427 4.356 0.604
(0.100) (0.092)
Above Median GPA 0.577 0.570 0.918
(0.050) (0.052)
Prior Contest Experience 0.135 0.128 0.875
(0.035) (0.035)
Panel B: Outcomes
Average Ranking 0.369 0.294 0.656
(0.118) (0.121)
Submitted Project 0.104 0.074 0.476
(0.031) (0.027)
Average Ranking 3.583 3.904 0.702
Conditional on Submitting (0.415) (0.792)
N 96 94
Notes: The table compares average characteristics and innovation contest performance of non-encouraged and encouraged students. The p-values of t-tests assessing
whether the means are significantly different across the two groups of students are reported in the fourth column. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Female and
CS/EE Major weighted to account for over sampling in the induced treatment. CGPA is measured on a scale from 1-6 with 1 being less than 2.0, 2 being 2.0-2.49, 3
being 2.50-2.99, 4 being 3.0-3.49, 5 being 3.50-3.99, and 6 being 4.0. Average ranking is equal to the average rank assigned to the project by the three judges assigned to
the project for participants who submitted a project for judgment, and zero for those who did not. Each judge scored 7 projects, so this measure ranges from 7 as the
highest rank to 1 as the lowest.
� significant at 10%;
�� significant at 5%;
��� significant at 1%
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214155.t002
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out of innovating. Consistent with no significant average effects of encouragement or induce-
ment on performance, we do not find a relationship between self-reported effort on the contest
and whether a participant is induced or encouraged (see S12 Table).
We also investigate whether encouragement led to a change in the quality distribution of
submissions by plotting the distribution of average rankings conditional on submissions for
the encouraged and non-encouraged samples (S2 Fig). The evidence from this graph demon-
strates that submissions made by those in the encouraged sample have a higher frequency of
very low or very high performance, and that the encouraged sample is about twice as likely to
have an average rank of at least 4 (the sample median score) than the non-encouraged sample.
While these differences are not statistically significant, to the extent that firms mostly value
output in the upper tail of the quality distribution, they provide some suggestive evidence that
encouragement may be beneficial.
Heterogeneity in average outcomes by GPA
We theorized in our motivating framework that the presence of performance differences
between induced and self-selected participants would depend on the characteristics of the
individuals drawn into the competition. In particular, induced participants should do worse
than their self-selected counterparts if the initially reluctant students are drawn from the
lower end of the probability of innovative success distribution. If, on the other hand, the
induced participants were initially on the sidelines simply because their costs of participating
were higher than those of their self-selected counterparts then they should not perform
worse in the contest. In reality, our inducement intervention could draw in both types of
individuals.
Fig 1 examines these differential effects in greater detail. It presents the difference in mean
contest performance between induced and self-selected contest participants for below- and
above-median CGPA participants respectively. These means support our predictions that
when inducement leads individuals who are less capable of innovating to participate in innova-
tion, it leads to lower innovative performance. In particular, induced students with low GPAs
perform significantly worse, about 250 percent worse, in the contest than their self-selected
peers, whereas high-GPA participants who were induced perform statistically the same as
those who self-selected into the contest. These findings are robust to regression analysis with
interactions between GPA and inducement and controls for participant characteristics as dem-
onstrated in S7 Table.
Interestingly, the highest performers are self-selected low-GPA students suggesting that
they may have private information about their innovative capabilities that are not reflected in
their academic performance.
Recall from Proposition 3, that encouragement may have differential effects based on stu-
dents’ innovative abilities. For example, lower-ability participants may be less confident than
high-ability ones, with encouragement disproportionately helping the former. Fig 2 examines
this directly. It presents the difference in mean contest performance between encouraged and
not encouraged for participants below and above the median CGPA for all participants. Low-
GPA students benefit from the additional support provided by encouragement—performing
about three times better than their non-encouraged peers. The impacts on high GPA students
are quite surprising. Not only do they not benefit from this encouragement, but they appear to
be harmed by it. Non-encouraged high GPA participants perform five times better than those
who were encouraged. These findings are robust to regression analysis with interactions
between GPA and encouragement and controls for participant characteristics as demonstrated
in S10 Table.
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Given our initial hypothesis that our encouragement intervention would impact the self-
selected and induced populations differently, we also examine whether encouragement affects
contest performance among high and low GPA students differently depending on whether
they are induced or self-selected. We do not find any evidence of differential impacts of
encouragement across these sub-samples (see S11 Table).
Evidence from our post-contest survey responses suggests one reason our encouragement
intervention harms the performance of high GPA students—it appears to increase the salience
of the time commitment required for the contest. In particular, we find that the encourage-
ment treatment is associated with an approximately thirty percentage point increase in the
likelihood that participants report not submitting a project for consideration by the judges due
to time constraints. By contrast we find no relationship between being induced or encouraged
and participants reporting that they did not submit due to the difficulty of the contest problem.
S12 Table reports these estimates. Whether the negative effect of encouragement on high GPA
students also relates to the crowding out of intrinsic motivation remains an open question
[23].
Conclusion
Our study provides novel evidence that some STEM students may be selecting out of innova-
tive activities based on their expected performance, while others select out based on the costs
of participating. The results demonstrate that innovators can be created by subsidizing their
initial entry into innovative tasks, but that targeting inducement towards those who select out
Fig 1. Difference in average ranking by self-selected and induced participants and GPA. The figure compares
average contest performance across below and above median CGPA students, and self-selected and induced students.
Standard errors are displayed as black bars. Average ranking is equal to the average rank assigned to the project by the
three judges assigned to the project for participants who submitted a project for judgment, and zero for those who did
not. Each judge scored 7 projects, so this measure ranges from 7 as the highest rank to 1 as the lowest.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214155.g001
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due to their expected cost of participation rather than their expected performance is a more
effective strategy to promote innovation. That such targeting can be based on relatively easy
information to obtain, like training and GPA, suggests that such a strategy may be both practi-
cal and cost effective. In addition, we demonstrate that encouragement may also need to be
targeted to improve the performance of those students who stand to benefit the most from it,
and importantly, to avoid harming those who may respond negatively.
Several important caveats of our study are worth highlighting. First, the sample of students
who submitted a project for consideration is quite low. Although we have anecdotal evidence
that a 10% submission rate is standard for this type of competition, thus bolstering the external
validity of our findings, some of our insignificant results may be in part due to lack of statistical
power. Second, while our encouragement emails were motivated by evidence on motivating
employees [17], there are many ways to provide students with encouragement aimed at
enhancing performance. Accordingly, it remains possible that alternative encouragement
interventions could avoid the detrimental effects on the performance of high GPA students
while still improving outcomes for those with lower GPAs. Third, our measures of contest suc-
cess are based on quantifiable performance metrics provided by expert evaluators rather than
market-based measures of success.
Lastly, how well our findings generalize to entry into and performance for those in innova-
tive careers likely depends on the specific characteristics of those careers. Innovation is clearly
not limited to STEM fields. In our study, we have have attempted to make our contest as simi-
lar as possible to the types of innovation tasks a STEM graduate might face in an innovative
job by setting the problem while providing limited guidance on requirements for the solution
Fig 2. Change in average ranking due to encouragement by GPA. The figure compares average contest performance
across below and above median CGPA students, and those who received the encouragement treatment and those who
did not. Standard errors are displayed as black bars. Average ranking is equal to the average rank assigned to the
project by the three judges assigned to the project for participants who submitted a project for judgment, and zero for
those who did not. Each judge scored 7 projects, so this measure ranges from 7 as the highest rank to 1 as the lowest.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214155.g002
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[24]. Moreover, many technology companies run innovation contests for their employees to
encourage innovation (see https://devpost.com/ for examples). At the same time, employees in
a company typically have managers they can turn to with technical or design questions, and
they likely have other social and technical resources that participants in our contest did not
have access to. Investigating whether these resources change the performance of some or all
innovator types, particularly those who need an additional nudge to enter these careers, is an
important area for future research.
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S1 Fig. Average judge ranking by induced and self-selected samples. The figure compares
the distribution of contest performance across the induced and self-selected sample. Average
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��� significant at 1%.
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S2 Table. Effect of encouragement treatment on contest outcomes. Standard errors are in
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nificant at 1%.
(PDF)
S3 Table. Difference in outcomes for induced and self-selected innovators by gender. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. � significant at 10%; �� significant at 5%; ��� significant at 1%.
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cant at 10%; �� significant at 5%; ��� significant at 1%.
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S6 Table. Interaction between induced innovators & encouragement treatment. Tandard
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dard errors are in parentheses. � significant at 10%; �� significant at 5%; ��� significant at 1%.
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S8 Table. Difference in outcomes for induced and self-selected innovators by GPA con-
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S9 Table. Effect of encouragement treatment by GPA. Standard errors are in parentheses.
� significant at 10%; �� significant at 5%; ��� significant at 1%.
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S10 Table. Effect of encouragement treatment by GPA, controls. Tandard errors are in
parentheses. All columns include controls for participant gender, year of study, whether or not
they major in computer science or electrical engineering, and whether or not they have prior
innovation contest experience.
(PDF)
S11 Table. Difference in outcomes for induced and self-selected participants by encourage-
ment and GPA. Standard errors are in parentheses. � significant at 10%; �� significant at 5%;
��� significant at 1%.
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